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ARTICLES
READING FOR TERRORISM: SECTION 215 OF THE
USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY
Michael J. O'Donnell*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Anarchist's Cookbook. Slaughterhouse Five. Mein Kampf Advanced
Techniques of Clandestine Psychedelic and Amphetamine Manufacture. The Turner
Diaries.
What do these controversial books say about their readers? Is it safe to assume that
they are anarchists? Anti-war activists? Nazis? Drug lords? Terrorists? In a culture
fiercely protective of free speech, the answers to these questions at first blush seem
obvious: of course not. Most of the readers are academics, students, concerned parents,
or just curious citizens. Yet in the wake of the devastating terrorist attacks of
September 11, entrenched American assumptions about the freedom to read without
fear of persecution are under question. In particular, a controversial provision of the
USA PATRIOT Act has sparked an intense debate about whether reading materials are
an appropriate subject of inquiry for law enforcement officials investigating terrorism.
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended and expanded the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act's (FISA)2 provisions governing access to "business
records" for international terrorism and foreign intelligence investigations.3  This
provision of FISA allows FBI officials to order the production of documents and
records; upon an application, an Article III or magistrate judge then enters an ex parte
order compelling the release of the items sought.4 Section 215 made several significant
changes to FISA's business records section. First, it expanded the type of records that
FBI officials could request. FISA had allowed requests for the records of transportation
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1. See The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 215, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (Supp. 1 2001)
(hereinafter "USA PATRIOT Act"].
2. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 47, and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "FISA"].
3. See USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
4. See id. at § 215 (a)(l), (b)(1) & (2), (c)(l).
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carriers, hotels, storage locker facilities, and vehicle rental agencies only. 5  After
amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act, the provision now allows requests for any
relevant "tangible item (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items), ' 6 which, as interpreted by Attorney General John Ashcroft, authorizes the FBI
to obtain such articles as education records, computer files, and, significantly for the
purposes of this Article, book purchase and library borrowing records.7 Second, section
215 amended FISA to allow the FBI to apply for an order without showing any
suspicion that the target of the investigation is involved in terrorism or proof that the
requested items show involvement in terrorist activity; the records merely must be
"sought for" a foreign intelligence or terrorism investigation.8  Third, section 215
imposes a gag order prohibiting all individuals, including those to whom the FBI directs
its section 215 requests, from disclosing the fact of the requests "to any other person.
' 9
Section 215 has become the object of intense controversy and criticism. Civil
liberties organizations, the American Library Association,
11 and the popular press 12
have denounced the USA PATRIOT Act in general, and section 215 in particular. A
bill entitled the "Freedom to Read Protection Act," introduced by Representative
Bernard Sanders of Vermont and co-sponsored by 144 members of Congress in 2003, is
among several legislative proposals seeking to exempt libraries and bookstores from the
reach of section 215; it currently awaits further action in a House subcommittee. 13 The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf of six Arab and Islamic
5. See 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2000) (prior to 2001 amendment).
6. USA PATRIOT Act § 215(a)(1).
7. See Hearing on the USA PATRIOT Act Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 45
(2003) (testimony of John Ashcroft, Attorney General).
8. Compare USA PATRIOT Act § 215(b)(2), with 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000) (prior to 2001
amendment).
9. USA PATRIOT Act § 215(d). For further analysis of the section 215 changes to FISA, see generally
CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, LIBRARIES AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT (2003), available
at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/civilliberties/theusapatriotact/CRS215LibrariesAnalysis.pdf (last
visited Oct. 21, 2004).
10. See, e.g., Ann Beeson & Jameel Jaffer, American Civil Liberties Union, Unpatriotic Acts: The FBI's
Power to Rifle Through Your Records and Personal Belongings Without Telling You (2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13245 (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security for the Post-September 11 United States 15-
30 (Fiona Doherty & Deborah Pearlstein eds., 2003), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormai.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2004).
11. See American Library Ass'n, Resolution on the USA PATRIOT Act and Related Measures that
Infringe on the Rights of Library Users (Jan. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=ifresolutions&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentlD=l 1891 (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) [hereinafter ALA Resolution].
12. See, e.g., Editorial, Ashcroft's Dragnet, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2003, at A14; Editorial, Don't Let
Patriot Act Go Overboard, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 25, 2003, at 10A; Editorial, Heightened Alert:
Increased Government Intrusion Is Not Patriotic, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 2003, at 34; Editorial, No
Shushing the Librarians, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at B6; Editorial, Patriot Act's Gag Order Deserves
Legal Scrutiny, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 3, 2003, at 12A; Editorial, The Politics of Security, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2004, at 22; Editorial, Rights and the New Reality, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at 14; Editorial, Take a Patriot
to Court, OREGONIAN, Aug. 1, 2003, at E4.
13. See Freedom to Read Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1157, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to exempt bookstores and libraries from orders requiring the production
of any tangible things for certain foreign intelligence investigations, and for other purposes."). For other
currently pending bills, see discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
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organizations and supported by nineteen amici curiae, has filed suit to challenge section
215 as facially invalid under the First and Fourth Amendments.
14
In response to the upstart, Attorney General John Ashcroft launched a speaking
tour in defense of the USA PATRIOT Act in the fall of 2003 in which he branded
critics of section 215 "hysterics" who were indulging in "fantasies" about trench-coated
FBI agents trolling libraries for information on citizens reading "the latest Tom Clancy
Novel." 15  Conservative commentators similarly decried the perceived overreaction,
arguing that section 215 is actually targeted at hotel and bank records, has never been
used, and is set to expire in 2005.16
Litigants have advanced arguments against the constitutionality of section 215
under the First and Fourth Amendments. In Muslim Community Association v.
Ashcroft, 17 the ACLU is currently pressing the claim that section 215 is facially invalid
as a violation of the Fourth Amendment because, although it implicates an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, it does not require probable cause, and because it
lacks procedural safeguards.18 The ACLU also claims that section 215 violates the First
Amendment by implicating speech activity without providing a compelling state interest
or a narrowly tailored program. 19 Similarly, commentators have tended to focus their
attention on section 215 and government surveillance of readers more generally through
the rubric of the First and Fourth Amendments.
20
14. See Muslim Cmty. Ass'n v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003). A similar
lawsuit by the ACLU recently became the first-ever successful challenge to a surveillance provision of the
USA PATRIOT Act. See Doe v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 2614 (VM), 2004 WL 2185571, at *41 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2004) (striking down portions of 18 U.S.C. § 2709, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, which
allows the FBI to compel internet service providers and telephone companies to produce customer records in
connection with terrorism investigations); Julia Preston, Judge Strikes Down Section of Patriot Act Allowing
Secret Subpoenas ofInternet Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A26.
15. See Hon. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Protecting Life and Liberty, Remarks in
Memphis, Tennessee (Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/091803memphisremarks.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); Hon. John
Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, The Proven Tactics in the Fight Against Crime, Remarks in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/091503nationalrestaurant.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). Ashcroft's
critics have denounced his defense of the USA PATRIOT Act as dishonest and deceptive. Legal scholar and
civil libertarian David Cole, On the Road with Ashcroft, NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 22, claims that
"Ashcroft's defense of the few provisions it chooses to address is highly misleading," for instance in its
assurance that library records were available to law enforcement through subpoenas prior to the enactment of
section 215. Id. Professor Cole observes that those subpoenas are limited to public, criminal investigations,
whereas section 215 enables secret terrorism investigations. See id. The ACLU has even gone so far as to
prepare a report highlighting "half-truths" and "plain[] and demonstrabl[e] falsehoods" in Justice Department
defenses of the USA PATRIOT Act. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SEEKING TRUTH FROM JUSTICE
1(2003).
16. See, e.g., Joseph Bottum, The Library Lie, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 26, 2004; Rich Lowry,
Patriot Hysteria, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry082803.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
17. No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003).
18. See P's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 25-31, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913
(E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=14305 (last visited
Oct. 21, 2004).
19. See id. at 35-37. The ACLU also presses the claim that section 215 deprives individuals of their
Fifth Amendment due process rights by compelling production without procedural rights, such as notice and
the opportunity to be heard. See id. at 31-32.
20. See Robert M. O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973)
(First Amendment); Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA PATRIOT Act's Application to Library Patron Records,
20041
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This Article investigates the possibility of challenging section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act in the context of reading records on other grounds: as a violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to information privacy as defined
by the Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe21 and affirmed in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services.22  Although government surveillance of reading habits to many
implicates First Amendment rights, to its most ardent opponents, this behavior is
equally pernicious to the privacy rights of library patrons, which enable the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms. 23 And while in the criminal investigation context privacy
rights are more commonly protected (or not protected) by the Fourth Amendment's
warrant, probable cause, and reasonableness requirements, the Whalen right to
information privacy is also apposite and worthy of consideration. This liberty guarantee
offers a colorable basis for challenging section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and at
the same time presents a useful opportunity for courts to develop further an important
line of constitutional jurisprudence in an era in which civil liberties need all the help
they can get.
Part I of this Article discusses the existence of a constitutional right to information
privacy under the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the lower courts. Part II
works section 215 into the doctrinal framework of the information privacy case law,
paying particular attention to two challenges that litigants must overcome to succeed in
overturning section 215. Part III completes the analysis by examining the government's
justification for section 215 on the merits. The Article concludes that, while focusing
on the right to information privacy would admittedly be an ambitious means of
challenging government surveillance of reading records, it nonetheless deserves the
serious attention of civil libertarians.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY
The constitutional right to information privacy was born inauspiciously in the
Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Whalen.24 The case involved a challenge to a New
York statute governing prescription drugs that called for the retention of all prescription
records for dangerous drugs with legitimate purposes-such as opium, cocaine, and
amphetamines-by the state department of health. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court in a 7-2 opinion, upheld the statute's constitutionality but first opined that "[t]he
cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two
different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
29 J. LEcils. 283, 292-295 (2003) (Fourth Amendment); Ulrika Edman Ault, Note, The FBI's Library
Awareness Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1532, 1565 (1990).
21. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
22. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
23. See ALA Resolution, supra note 11 (discussing "the dangers to individual privacy and the
confidentiality of library records" posed by the USA PATRIOT Act and urging librarians "to defend and
support user privacy" as well as "free and open access to knowledge and information").
24. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-606. One commentator referred to Whalen's announcement of the right to
information privacy as a mere "lukewarm hint," and argued that "the federal constitutional right to
informational privacy is, at best, limited." Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the
Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089, 1127 (2002).
25. See 429 U.S. at 592-93 & n.8.
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personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."26 The Court found that the statute "threaten[ed] to impair...
[plaintiffs'] interest in the nondisclosure of private information," but ultimately held
that it did not, "on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to [that] interest to
establish a constitutional violation," largely because of security provisions in place to
prevent disclosure of confidential information.27 In this way, Justice Stevens split the
constitutional jurisprudence on privacy into two spheres: decisional privacy, of the Roe
v. Wade28 and Griswold v. Connecticu?9 stripe, and informational privacy, which was
at issue in Whalen itself.
30
The information privacy strain was also at issue in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,3 1 in which the Court allowed a federal statute to authorize seizure of
President Nixon's presidential papers but directed the government in hortatory terms to
release his purely private communications. 32 There, the Court found that "the privacy
interest asserted by [President Nixon] is weaker than that found wanting in the recent
decision of Whalen v. Roe."33 However, the Court also noted, after restating Whalen's
rights-creating statement, that "[w]e may agree with [Nixon] that, at least when
Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life
unrelated to any acts done by them in their personal capacity. ' 34  This passage is
viewed by many courts35 and scholars36 as an affirmation of the constitutional right to
information privacy enunciated in Whalen and constitutes the last direct statement by
the Supreme Court on the matter.
26. Id. at 599-60 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 600.
28. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
29. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. Justices Brennan and Stewart offered divergent interpretations of the Court's decision in separate
concurring opinions. Compare 429 U.S. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Broad dissemination by state
officials of [information about prescription drug use] . . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected
privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests." (citation omitted)), with
429 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The only possible support in [Justice Brennan's] opinion for this
statement is its earlier reference to two footnotes in the Court's opinion. The footnotes, however, cite to only
two Court opinions, and those two cases do not support the proposition advanced by Mr. Justice Brennan.").
31. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
32. See id. at 457-59.
33. Id. at 457.
34. Id. Professor Lin observes, however, that Nixon "seem[s] almost to weaken the constitutional
interest" discussed in Whalen. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1125.
35. For particularly generous readings of Nixon, see Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir.
1978) ("The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the privacy of one's personal affairs is protected by
the Constitution.") and Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part by Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Any doubt about the
constitutional standing of the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters remaining after Whalen v.
Roe was removed by Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.").
36. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 188 (2003) ("After
Whalen, the Court affirmed this notion of constitutional protection for information privacy in Nixon .... ");
Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can Congress Protect Confidential Medical Information in
the "Information Age"?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223, 239 n.86 (1999); Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of
the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Information Privacy,
10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 497 (1990).
20041
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Although the federal constitutional right to information privacy hangs by a thin
reed in terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence, it has been developed more fully in the
lower federal and state courts, and especially in the federal courts of appeals. 37 Indeed,
one commentator has suggested that Whalen and Nixon represented an invitation by the
Supreme Court for lower courts to develop the constitutional right of information
privacy on a case-by-case basis.3 8 Cases involving medical information have received
strong protection. For instance, in Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center,39 a federal
district court found a violation of the constitutional right to information privacy in a
hospital's policy of allowing chaplains access to patient files. 40 Similarly, in Doe v.• 41
Borough of Barrington, a federal court held that a police officer violated a family's
Whalen rights by disclosing a close relative's AIDS status to strangers.42 A number of
other cases have afforded strong protection for medical information under the
constitutional right to privacy.
43
In addition, the Whalen right to information privacy has arguably protected
personal information that implicates liberty interests under the Griswold decisional
privacy cases. Two recent opinions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
a noted leader in constitutional information privacy jurisprudence,44 demonstrate this
37. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is a notable exception to the general trend of the
circuits to recognize a constitutional right to information privacy. In its 1981 opinion, J.P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), the court held that the post-adjudication dissemination of juvenile delinquents'
case histories to social service agencies did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 1090-91.
The court stated:
We do not view the discussion of confidentiality in Whalen v. Roe as overruling Paul v. Davis and
creating a constitutional right to have all government action weighed against the resulting breach
of confidentiality .... Absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court we will not construe
isolated statements in Whalen and Nixon more broadly than their context allows to recognize a
general constitutional right to have disclosure of private information measured against the need for
disclosure.
Id. at 1088-89. The court affirmed this reasoning as recently as 1999, in Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466
(6th Cir. 1999), in which it refused to acknowledge the creation of a constitutional right in Whalen and Nixon.
Id. at 480. The court has, however, found violations of information privacy rights of constitutional dimension.
See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062 (6th Cir. 1998) (city's release of arresting police
officers' personnel files to violent criminal defendants, by threatening the officers' lives, implicates
Fourteenth Amendment interests, requiring a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means to survive
scrutiny).
38. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 498 ("[T]he [Whalen and Nixon] decisions might properly be
interpreted as suggesting that it would be appropriate for federal and state courts to find violations of the
constitutional right to privacy in circumstances where the government invasion of privacy was significant and
unjustified.").
39. 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
40. See id. at 1271.
41. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
42. See id. at 390.
43. See, e.g., Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) ("In this Circuit, the right [of
confidentiality] clearly covers medical records and communications."); Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.
(SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1143 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing a constitutional privacy right in one's prescription
information but finding that right outweighed in the particular case); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535
(10th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging a constitutional privacy right in the contents of medical records); Doe v. City
of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding constitutional protection in an individual's HIV
positive status, which was released in a conciliation agreement); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d. Cir. 1980) ("There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may
contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection.").
44. See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 36, at 190.
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point. In Gruenke v. Seip,45 the court found that a high school swimming coach's
demand that a student take a pregnancy test infringed upon the student's privacy
46 47
rights. And in the heartbreaking case Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, the court
held that a police officer's threat to disclose the homosexual orientation of an eighteen-
year-old boy-which led the boy to commit suicide-violated the Constitution's
protection of information privacy. 48 In recognizing the boy's "clearly established right
to privacy as protected by the Constitution," the court observed that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine a more private matter than one's sexuality." 49  This nascent trend will be
explored at greater length later in this article.
50
At least eight circuits have also found that the Whalen right to information privacy
extends to financial information. 5 1 In Denius v. Dunlap,52 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit found that a teacher's employment contract requiring a grant of
access to "all records concerning" the applicant, including financial and credit
information, infringed on the teacher's right to confidentiality. 53 The Fifth Circuit, in
Plante v. Gonzalez,54 also determined that the constitutional right to privacy covers
financial information, noting that the "substantial" interest in such privacy is "protected
constitutionally." 55 Nevertheless, that court found that the public's right to know about
elected officials' financial information under the state's "Sunshine Amendment"
outweighed the privacy interest in a heightened scrutiny balancing analysis and upheld
the challenged amendment.
56
The constitutional right to information privacy has thus arguably been defined by
the Supreme Court and expounded upon at some length in the lower federal courts to
cover a broad range of confidential information categories. One may safely assume,
therefore, that barring a significant re-assessment of twenty-five years of federal
appellate court jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, a Whalen challenge to section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act would at least receive serious consideration in the federal
courts.
45. 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
46. See id. at 301.
47. 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000).
48. See id. at 196-97.
49. Id. at 193, 196.
50. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
51. See Denius, 209 F.3d at 957 ("Seven of our sister circuits have found that the constitutional right of
privacy in confidential information covers some financial disclosures."). The Seventh Circuit went on in
Denius to join the majority of federal appellate courts to recognize Whalen protection for financial
information. See id. at 958.
52. 209 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000).
53. See id. at 949, 958. The court, however, granted qualified immunity to the defendant, who directed a
school program affiliated with a military base, because the law had not been sufficiently developed at the time
of the incidents that gave rise to the suit. See id. at 958. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the defendant's
summary judgment claim, directing the lower court to consider the possibility of equitable relief, which was
not barred by qualified immunity. See id. On remand, after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, the
district court entered a judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff. See Denius, 303 F.3d at 921.
54. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. See id. at 1135.
56. See id. at 1136 ("Financial privacy is a matter of serious concern, deserving strong protection. The
public interests supporting public disclosure for these elected officials are even stronger.").
2004]
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The next section of this Article analyzes several of the key doctrinal questions that
would likely confront a litigant challenging section 215 as a violation of the right to
information privacy and suggests how these could be resolved in favor of protecting
privacy.
III. FITTING SECTION 215 INTO THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVACY
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act is not precisely the type of measure that has
been challenged successfully under the constitutional right to information privacy. The
majority of cases that protect Whalen privacy rights, as noted above, involve such
information as medical history or financial records; none addresses book purchasing or
borrowing records. Further, section 215 authorizes government collection of
information, whereas Whalen itself described the right to privacy as an "interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 57  Several key questions must therefore be
answered before government searches of library borrowing records can fall within the
doctrinal framework of the cases protecting privacy as a constitutional right, at which
point courts would balance the threatened privacy interests with the government interest
at stake. 58  Does information about one's reading habits fit within the type of
information protected by the right to confidentiality-in other words, are reading
records truly private? 59  Should courts reject a strict demarcation between collection
and disclosure of information in their constitutional analysis of privacy claims? This
section argues for an affirmative answer to these questions, bringing section 215
squarely within the crosshairs of a Whalen challenge.
60
A. Are Library Borrowing Records Private?
The first step in assessing whether a provision violates the constitutional right to
information privacy is determining whether the information sought is private. 6 1 The
Supreme Court in Nixon discussed the existence of constitutional protection based on
the type of information involved and the reasonable expectation that it would remain
confidential. 62 Lower courts have phrased the inquiry in various terms: determining
57. Whalen, 529 U.S. at 599 (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577-78 (finding a privacy interest in the plaintiff's
medical records and proceeding to weigh that interest against the government's regulatory goal).
59. See Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (characterizing the constitutional right to
information privacy as "a right to 'confidentiality"').
60. Another potential barrier in the case of libraries is the argument that it is implausible to fashion a
constitutional violation on collection of information from one government agency (library) by another (law
enforcement). While this point perhaps deserves some attention, it is sufficient for these purposes to note the
existence of authority finding a violation of privacy rights in inter-governmental sharing of information. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Austin, 632 F.2d 1202, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding an implication of a legitimate privacy
interest in government welfare agency's sharing of client information with law enforcement officials).
61. See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 193 ("We first ask whether [plaintiff] had a protected privacy right
concerning [defendant's] threat to disclose his suspected sexual orientation.").
62. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465 ("[A]ppellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal
communications. But the [privacy] must be viewed in the context of . . . his lack of any expectation of
privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials, [and] of the important public interest in preservation of
the materials."). See also Denius, 209 F.3d at 958.
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whether plaintiffs have a legitimate expectation of privacy;63 whether the information is
within an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality; 64 whether the
individual's privacy interest is of constitutional dimension;65 and, portentously for
section 215 plaintiffs, whether the information impacts other fundamental rights.
66
Because no single test predominates, this section analyzes broadly applicable
conceptions of reader privacy that would be useful in litigating under any given
standard.
As a preliminary matter, the constitutional analysis of the Whalen right to
information privacy is conceptually and doctrinally distinct from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, several features of which could otherwise prove fatal to a section 215
challenge. A Fourth Amendment defense of section 215 would likely claim that
individuals do not have a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in their library borrowing
records for Fourth Amendment purposes under the rationale of Smith v. Maryland.67 In
that case, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment attack on the use of pen
registers, which allow investigators to record the telephone numbers dialed from a
particular phone line but do not record actual conversations. 68 The Court, in a passage
that has profoundly shaped the modem application of the Fourth Amendment, reasoned
that individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in information they
voluntarily convey to a third party-such as the defendant's phone records, which he
conveyed to the phone company through his daily telephone use.69 On these lines, a
plaintiffs library borrowing records would probably fail to trigger the Fourth
Amendment's protections because, through the act of checking out books, she would
effectively give the library her borrowing records.
70
Because there are no reported cases that address whether an individual's reading
habits or library borrowing records are private for Whalen purposes, the question, when
addressed by a court, will be one of first impression. Although pressing for recognition
of reading records as private can perhaps be analogized to courts' consistent protection
of financial information, 7 1 the link between the two is tenuous enough to require
independent analysis of the private nature of reading records. A general understanding
of individuals' expectations with regard to their reading habits, and an important, if
63. See Falvo ex. rel. Pletan v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F. 3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd on
other grounds, 534 U.S. 426 (2002), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 288 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2002).
Critically, the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
is not the same as the inquiry of the same name in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Cal. v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
64. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila. 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1987).
65. See Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1063.
66. See Denius, 209 F.3d at 958.
67. See 42 U.S. 735, 740-46 (1979).
68. See id. at 742, 745-46.
69. See id. at 743-44. In another key case decided before Smith, the Court used the same rationale to
conclude that individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their financial records held by
banks. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 453-55 (1976).
70. As one commentator recently noted, however, if a Fourth Amendment challenge were to make it past
this threshold test, the government would have difficulty explaining the probable cause and particularity
requirement infirmities of section 215. Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA PATRIOT Act's Application to
Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 296-300 (2003).
71. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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nascent, line of case law indicate that courts should bring library borrowing records
within Whalen's protective shield.
1. Reading and Societal Expectations
Any number of indicators demonstrate that society resoundingly recognizes an
individual's reading habits as private. While the next section argues from a normative
perspective why such information should be considered private, it is important first to
acknowledge society's (including courts') broad representations to this effect. Case
law, federal and state legislation, and the impassioned entreaties of librarians and
booksellers all point to this recognition, which should color a court's decision whether
to analyze section 215 under the constitutional right to information privacy.
Although no reported cases analyze whether one's reading habits are private for
Whalen purposes, two recent and prominent cases provide a strong judicial
acknowledgment of privacy in reading records. In Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of
Thornton,72 the Colorado Supreme Court used the state constitution to "protect an
individual's fundamental right to purchase books anonymously, free from governmental
interference."'73  After DEA agents found "how-to" drug manufacture books and a
bookstore shipping envelope at the site of a home methamphetamine lab, they obtained
a search warrant for the bookstore.74 The Colorado Supreme Court strongly sided with
the bookstore, which sued to prevent execution of the warrant on First Amendment
grounds. 75  The court held that the United States Supreme Court's standard from
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,76 requiring mere compliance with the Fourth Amendment's
particularity requirement in searches that implicate First Amendment rights, was
insufficient for state constitutional purposes, instead applying strict scrutiny in
examining the warrant. 77 The court ultimately struck down the warrant for lack of a
compelling governmental interest, remarking on the importance of privacy for the
uninhibited exercise of First Amendment rights.
78
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia demanded strict
scrutiny analysis in the context of a demand for book purchase records in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc. 79 That case involved Independent
Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's subpoena of Monica Lewinsky's book purchase records for
the period 1995 to 1998; 80 both Lewinsky and the bookstores involved moved to quash
72. 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002).
73. Id. at 1047.
74. Id. at 1048-49. The books were colorfully entitled Advanced Techniques of Clandestine Psychedelic
and Amphetamine Manufacture, by Uncle Fester, and The Construction and Operation of Clandestine Drug
Laboratories, by Jack B. Nimble.
75. See id. at 1051.
76. 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978).
77. See Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1055-58.
78. See id. at 1052, 1063. The court rejected the government's three proffered interests: helping to
prove the mens rea of the crime of operating a methamphetamine lab; proving which criminal defendant
occupied the bedroom in which the lab was operated; and connecting a particular suspect to the crime. See id.
at 1061.
79. See 26 MED. L. RPTR. 1599, 1601 (D.D.C. 1998).
80. See id. at 1599. Specifically, Starr was interested in whether Lewinsky had purchased a torrid novel
by Nicholson Baker entitled "Vox." Associated Press, Starr to Receive Book List from Lewinsky, CHI. TRIB.,
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the subpoena.8 1 Although the court announced that the request would have to overcome
strict scrutiny review because of its tendency to chill the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms, Lewinsky ultimately agreed to a deal in which she disclosed her purchase
records directly to Whitewater prosecutors. 82 These two cases-the only two of their
kind, according to the court in Tattered Cover 83-stand for the proposition that courts
will strongly protect the privacy of individuals who do not wish their book purchases to
be made known to investigators in order to protect the First Amendment rights of the
readers and the book providers in question.
84
Federal and state legislation also points to strong support for privacy protection
surrounding an individual's reading choices. Congressman Bernard Sanders's Freedom
to Read Protection Act, which has 144 co-sponsors, is only one of several currently
pending federal efforts to support reader privacy in the face of section 215.85 Other
prominent offerings include the Security and Freedom Ensured (SAFE) Act,86
introduced by Senator Larry Craig of Idaho, and the Library, Bookseller, and Personal
Records Privacy Act,87 introduced by Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin. On the
state level, forty-eight of fifty states have statutory measures protecting library
borrowing information as confidential. 88 Although section 215 supersedes these laws in
practice, they nevertheless stand as an extraordinary testament to the importance that
individuals and their elected representatives attach to the privacy of reading
information.
89
June 23, 1999, at 8.
81. 26 MED. L. RPTR. at 1599.
82. Associated Press, supra note 80.
83. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1056 (noting that aside from the Tattered Covered case the court's
"independent research discloses, only one previous case [Kramerbooks] where a court has considered the
constitutionality of law enforcement attempts to gain access to the purchase records of a bookstore
customer").
84. See Kramerbooks, 26 MED. L. RPTR. at 1600 ("The bookstores and Ms. Lewinsky have persuasively
alleged a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights."); Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1051 (finding that the
right to receive information and ideas is "necessary to the successful and uninhibited exercise of the
specifically enumerated right to freedom of speech") (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Freedom to Read Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1157, 108th Cong. (Mar. 6, 2003).
86. Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003, S. 1709, 108th Cong. § 1 (Oct. 2, 2003) (stating that the
purposes of the bill is "[t]o amend the USA PATRIOT Act to place reasonable limitations on the use of
surveillance and the issuance of search warrants, and for other purposes").
87. Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act, S. 1507, 108th Cong. (July 31, 2003) ("A bill
to protect privacy by limiting the access of the government to library, bookseller, and other personal records
for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes."). See also Library and Bookseller Protection Act,
S. 1158, 108th Cong. (May 23, 2003) (introduced by Sen. Barbara Boxer of California).
88. American Library Association, State Privacy Laws Regarding Library Records, at
http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=stateifcinaction&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.
cfrn&ContentlD=14773 (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-8-10 (2004) ("[T]he
registration and circulation records and information concerning the use of the public, public school, college
and university libraries of this state shall be confidential."); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 6267 (2004) ("All
registration and circulation records of any library which is in whole or in part supported by public funds shall
remain confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, local agency, or state agency .... ); 75 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/1-1(a) (2004) ("The registration and circulation records of a library are confidential
information."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 78, § 7 (2004) ("That part of the records of a public library which
reveals the identity and intellectual pursuits of a person using such library shall not be a public record as
defined by clause Twenty-sixth of section seven of chapter four.").
89. For a helpful discussion of relationships "analogous" to that of borrower-librarian that receive legal




The guardians of America's books-librarians and book-sellers-have also shown
an extraordinary unity behind the view that reading habits are private. Through op-
eds, library resolutions,9 1 and most importantly, the work of the organizational
mouthpiece of librarian activism, the American Library Association, 92 these individuals
share the view that one who does not wish his/her reading records to be collected or
disclosed has a right to privacy. Like the courts in Tattered Cover and Kramerbooks,
librarians and booksellers defend reader privacy on the view that a lack of privacy in
reading impinges upon the enjoyment of First Amendment rights.93
The above indications of a broad social recognition of the privacy rights of readers
are not precisely tailored to the particular requirements of each circuit's Whalen
jurisprudence, although they should contribute to a strong showing in those that require
a legitimate expectation of privacy94 or a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
95
Regardless of any specific jurisdiction's requirements, these indications are a powerful
demonstration that society strongly views reading records as private. As the next
section indicates, a budding line of information privacy case law also argues for a
finding that reading records are "private" for Whalen purposes precisely because of
their facilitation of First Amendment freedoms.
2. Readers' Privacy and the First Amendment
Beyond the reasonable expectation of confidentiality or legitimate expectation of
privacy tests, several courts have articulated a potentially more generous basis for
finding that information is private for constitutional purposes: it impacts other
constitutional rights. 96 On this analysis, a litigant challenging section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act could make a strong showing that reading records are private under
Whalen because government collection of them infringes upon the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms.
90. See Frank Kramer, Why the Patriot Act Worries Booksellers, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2003, at A23
(authored by a bookstore owner).
91. See American Library Association, USA PATRIOT Act Resolutions of State Library Associations, at
http://www.ala.org/Template.cfin?Section=stateifcin
action&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=29738 (last visited Oct. 21, 2004)
(listing resolutions of all 50 states plus the District of Columbia).
92. See ALA Resolution, supra note 11 ("[T]he American Library Association encourages all librarians,
library administrators, library governing bodies, and library advocates to educate their users, staff, and
communities about the process for compliance with the USA PATRIOT Act and other related measures and
about the dangers to individual privacy and the confidentiality of library records resulting from those
measures."). The ALA has also historically been active in debates over free speech. See, e.g., American
Library Association, The Freedom to Read, in FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
137-38 (Sheila Suess Kennedy ed., 1999).
93. See ALA Resolution, supra note 11 ("Privacy is essential to the exercise of free speech, free thought,
and free association.").
94. See Falvo, 233 F.3d at 1208.
95. See Fraternal Order of Police, 812 F.2d at 112-13.
96. The Whalen plaintiffs arguably laid the groundwork for this line of analysis. In that case, they
unsuccessfully argued that the New York prescription law infringed upon their right to decisional privacy as a
derivative harm of its infringement of their fight to information privacy. After information about their drug
use was collected and possibly disseminated (information privacy harm), the patients claimed they would be
less likely to request and use certain drugs associated with a stigma (decisional privacy harm). See Whalen,




In Denius, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit strongly articulated
this basis for determining which information should be deemed private for Whalen
purposes.97  The court justified its holding that financial records qualify for Whalen
protection on the ground that "confidential financial information may implicate
substantial privacy concerns and impact other fundamental rights."98  The court,
however, offered little concrete explanation for the statement and has not expounded
upon it since. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals-ordinarily viewed as having
rejected a constitutional right to information privacy 99-arguably held on the facts of a
case that information that affects other constitutional interests qualifies for Whalen
protection. 00 In Kallstrom v. City of Columbus,101 the court found that a city's release
of police officers' personnel files to violent criminal defendants whom the officers had
arrested violated the officers' constitutional rights. 102  After acknowledging that its
decisions had read Whalen and Nixon narrowly, the court announced the applicable
standard: "This circuit ... will only balance an individual's interest in nondisclosure of
informational privacy against the public's interest in and need for the invasion of
privacy where the individual privacy interest is of constitutional dimension."'
10 3
Because the release of the information threatened the officers' due process rights to life
and personal security, in other words, the disclosure amounted to a possible
constitutional violation. 
104
Several decisions in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals also arguably recognize
privacy rights in information that implicates other constitutional liberties-although
perhaps in deed more than in word. In Sterling, the court found that a police officer's
threat to reveal the homosexuality of a teenage boy apprehended on other grounds
amounted to a violation of the Whalen right to information privacy. 10 5 Although the
court did not expressly rely on the impact of disclosure on the boy's decisional privacy
interests (his sexual behavior), one detects an implicit reliance in its analysis. 106 On this
view, the fact that the officer's decision to "out" the boy would have unquestionably
impacted the boy's sexual behavior (by, for instance, chilling his sexual activity to quell
others' suspicion of his homosexuality) favored giving the information constitutional
protection. 107  Further, in Gruenke, the Third Circuit found that a high school
97. Denius, 209 F.3d at 955-58.
98. Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
99. See supra note 37.
100. See Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062.
101. 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998).
102. See id. at 1055.
103. Id. at 1061 (citations omitted).
104. See id. at 1062.
105. See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 197-98.
106. For instance, in a footnote concluding the court's announcement of the "intrinsically private" nature
of information about sexual orientation, it cited with approval several cases that had found forced disclosure
of individuals' homosexuality unconstitutional on what appear to be decisional privacy grounds. See id. at
196 n.4. In light of a recent decision by the Supreme Court protecting the decisional privacy interest of all
individuals in private intimate behavior, the Sterling court's reliance, if it existed, could now be stated with
greater confidence. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
107. See Sterling, 232 F.3d at 198.
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swimming coach's demand that an eleventh-grade team member who he suspected was
pregnant take a pregnancy test violated the student's right to information privacy.
10 8
Again, the court did not rely on the impact of disclosure of the information on the
student's decision-making privacy rights, but one can clearly trace the reasoning that
would apply under the Seventh Circuit's "impact[s] other fundamental rights" analysis:
the coach's insistence on learning whether the student was pregnant and his disclosure
of that information to others could well influence the student's decisions with how to
proceed in her pregnancy-especially in light of the student's fear that pregnancy would
force her to quit the team. 109 Since decision-making about pregnancy and abortion is
protected under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth"10  and Fourteenth
Amendments, I"' information about pregnancy, the argument goes, deserves protection
under the constitutional right to information privacy. 112
b. Argument
This string of cases provides the foothold for a potentially powerful basis for
arguing that reading records should be private for Whalen purposes: government
collection of them chills the exercise of First Amendment rights. 113 Although this line
of doctrinal analysis is admittedly not well developed, advocates seeking to overturn
section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act on privacy grounds would do well to explore
and exploit it in a litigative challenge. For, as even a cursory exploration of the First
Amendment interests implicated by section 215 reveals, government collection of
reading records profoundly affects the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
Government surveillance and collection of reading records chills individuals'
exercise of the First Amendment right to receive information. 114  This right
encompasses Justice Brennan's oft-quoted view that "[i]t would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." 115 In other words, the right
to free expression is meaningless without the ability to read, listen to, or otherwise
receive the expression of others. 116 By chilling individuals' willingness to explore and
access reading materials that might be deemed suspicious by law enforcement officers,
section 215 clearly implicates this First Amendment freedom, which should contribute
to a finding that reading records are private for Whalen purposes.
Professor Julie Cohen, in examining the philosophical bridge between speech in its
various forms and the receipt of speech, has persuasively articulated the basis for First
108. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303.
109. See id. at 296-97.
110. U.S. CONST. amend V.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
112. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
113. First Amendment freedoms unquestionably stand on firmer constitutional footing as infringed
fundamental rights than the "substantive due process" interests that arguably have served as the basis for
information privacy protection in the Third Circuit cases.
114. For strong arguments that section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act also violates the First Amendment
as a prior restraint on librarians' ability to disclose the fact of FBI searches, see generally Pi's Resp. to Def's
Mot. to Dismiss at 37-39, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n. v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 2003).
115. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. See Ault, supra note 20 at 1540.
[Vol. 3 1:1
Reading For Terrorism
Amendment protection of the right to receive information:
Functionally, the activities of the recipient and the proponent of speech-
reading/hearing and speaking/writing, respectively-are properly viewed as two
halves of the same whole .... Thoughts and opinions, which are the predicates to
speech, cannot arise in a vacuum. Whatever their content, they are responses formed
to things heard or read. It is this iterative process of "speech-formation"-which
determines, ultimately, both the content of one's speech and the particular viewpoint
one espouses-that the First Amendment should shield from scrutiny.117
While the Supreme Court has not overtly recognized Cohen's proffered "right to read
anonymously," it has protected on First Amendment grounds the right to receive
information on several occasions. 118
Section 215 chills 119 the exercise of this right to receive information by casting a
cloud of subversiveness over the exploration of certain books, materials, and
information-namely, materials that trigger the FBI's suspicions. Without the
confidence that private inquiry affords, bookstore or library patrons may refrain from
searching databases, communicating with staff members, or exploring certain
controversial materials if they fear that their movements could be tracked by law
enforcement officials and used to mark them as terrorist suspects. 120  This self-
censorship of intellectual curiosity and free inquiry is not mitigated by the fact that
section 215 operates to prevent patrons from ever knowing that their activities have
been monitored by prohibiting librarians or booksellers from divulging the existence of
• .. .. 121
their investigation. The mere rumor that a single patron of a bookstore or library had
been surveilled would be enough to stifle the exploration of controversial materials for
many, if not all, of that facility's patrons. Further, although an individual might not
know that his or her reading records had been investigated because of the USA
PATRIOT Act's secrecy provisions, a society in which such law enforcement practices
are legally contemplated, employed, and tolerated would soon find itself enveloped by a
culture of self-censorship.
Thus the strongest basis on which to argue that reading records qualify as "private"
for purposes of the constitutional right to information privacy is the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' test that the collection of the information implicates fundamental
rights. Government surveillance of reading records unquestionably chills the First
Amendment freedom to receive information, making it an important category of
information for constitutional protection. As the next section demonstrates, the fact that
FBI agents merely collect reading records under section 215, as opposed to
117. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 981, 1006-07 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
118. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 557 (1969); Lamont, 381 U.S. at 301; Cohen, supra note 117,
at 1008-11. For a discussion of the framers' arguable support of the use of the First Amendment to protect
both speech and its receipt, see O'Neil, supra note 20, at 220-22.
119. For a slightly dated survey of First Amendment "chilling" cases, including those based on
government surveillance, see Ault, supra note 20, at 1544-48.
120. See Ault, supra note 20, at 1549.
121. See USA PATRIOT Act § 215(d) ("No person shall disclose to any other person ... that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.").
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disseminating that information to others, also should not stand in the way of a
successful Whalen challenge.
B. Collection Versus Disclosure: A Hazy Distinction
Critics might argue that section 215 does not implicate the constitutional right to
information privacy because that right prevents public disclosure of information,
whereas section 215 merely authorizes government collection of information-FBI
collection of reading records. 122  The very nature of the Whalen right, this argument
would contend, prevents state actors from making confidential information known to
the world; mere governmental collection of that information, with appropriate
safeguards, is less threatening. 123 This line of reasoning-perhaps the greatest obstacle
to a successful challenge of section 215 under Whalen-has found favor in several
circuit courts, and at least one state supreme court. 124 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit put it in its skeptical opinion in AFL-CIO v.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 125 and AFL-CIO v. Perry,126 "the
individual interest in protecting the privacy of the information sought by the
government is significantly less important where the information is collected by the
government but not disseminated publicly."
27
Three important points rebut critics' reliance on a sharp distinction between
collection and disclosure of private information for purposes of constitutional analysis.
First, contrary to the D.C. Circuit's contention, 128 the information privacy cases that
embrace a constitutional right do not monolithically involve government disclosure
rather than collection of information. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out
122. See id. at § 215(a)(1).
123. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (emphasizing the importance of security provisions and other
safeguards to protect against unwarranted public disclosure of information collected by government officials).
124. See Statharos v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 198 F.3d 317, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1999)
("[T]he plaintiffs' confidentiality interest in protecting their financial information from being revealed to the
world at large is significantly greater than their interest in protecting that information from being revealed to
[members of] the [New York City Taxi and Limousine] Commission."); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554, 1561 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The adverse effect of public disclosure on privacy interests is considerably
greater than the effect of disclosure to the City."); Stone v. City of Stow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301 (Ohio 1992)
("Whatever privacy interest the patients and physicians possess in these prescription records is limited to the
right not to have the information disclosed to the general public. Disclosures to police officers, or to officials
of the State Pharmacy Board, do not violate that right.").
Even Justice Brennan observed a difference between the routine and generally permissible collection of
information by government officials with a legitimate interest in the information, and the counterfactual and
impermissible "[b]road dissemination by state officials of such information" that "would clearly implicate
constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling state
interests." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, this point arguably leaves open
the challenge that even collection, when done without a proper government purpose, is problematic.
125. 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 793. The case involved a challenge by Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
employees to a department policy requiring employees to provide information about their finances and drug
use. Id. at 788-92. The court, after raising doubts about the existence of a constitutional right to information
privacy, held that even if such a right existed, the fact that the measure in question involved collection only
and not disclosure, coupled with security measures in place to prevent disclosure, required a finding that the
plaintiffs' rights had not been violated. Id. at 791-93.
128. Id. at 793 ("In fact, the [plaintiffs] could cite no case in which a court has found a violation of the
constitutional right to privacy where the government has collected, but not disseminated, the information.").
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in Plante, the Supreme Court case Nixon, viewed by many as validation for the right
announced in Whalen and one of only two Supreme Court cases directly on point,
"involved not public disclosure" of the President's personal information "but viewing
and screening of public and private documents by archivists"-collection, in other
words. 129 In this context, the Court recognized that President Nixon had "a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his personal communications,"' 130 and "was not wholly
without constitutionally protected privacy rights."' 131 Thus, according to the Supreme
Court's own analysis, mere collection of information can infringe upon the
constitutional right to information privacy.
Similarly, Whalen involved not a broadcast of individuals' private prescription
records but a collection of those records by government officials. 32 Although the
Court did not invalidate the statute authorizing this collection, the fact that it required
strong security measures to prevent disclosure demonstrates the Court's recognition of
the potential for unconstitutional invasions of privacy even when the challenged
measure allows collection rather than actual disclosure of information. 133  In other
words, the Court did not find that because the act in question merely authorized
collection rather than disclosure it survived constitutional attack. Rather, the Court
upheld the act because it authorized collection but maintained adequate safeguards to
prevent against disclosure.
This leads to a second point that brings section 215 under Whalen: it is a short
distance to travel between governmental collection of information and dissemination of
the same. As the Court in Whalen implicitly recognized, collection is merely the first
step to widespread disclosure. This point is graphically illustrated by the facts of
Borough of Barrington, a district court case. 134  There, during the arrest of the
plaintiffs husband, the husband advised the arresting officers of the Barrington police
department to take care in searching him because he was HIV positive. 135 Later in the
day in an unrelated traffic incident involving the plaintiff, word of the husband's
condition spread from the Barrington officers to the Runnemade police officers who
responded to the traffic incident, and from there to the other individuals involved in the
incident, who told parents whose children went to school with the plaintiff, and the local
media. 136 Thus the husband's initial warning to government officials quickly turned
into widespread public dissemination.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also recognized the ephemeral
border between collection and disclosure in connection with the ongoing dispute over
the Justice Department's demands that hospitals release records of patients who have
obtained so-called "partial-birth abortions" for the department's use in defending the
129. Id. at 1133.
130. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
131. Id. at 457.
132. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593-94.
133. See id. at 605-06. But see id. at 601 (stating that "[t]here is no support in the record ... for an
assumption that the security provisions of the statute will be administered improperly").
134. See Borough, 729 F. Supp. at 378-79.
135. See id. at 378.
136. See id. at 378-79.
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challenged Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.137 In rejecting the Justice
Department's subpoena of the records under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure rather than the Whalen right to information privacy, Judge Posner observed
that the fact that the government had merely collected patients' medical records did not
dampen the privacy harm they suffered. 138  Suggesting one possible way that their
information might be more broadly disseminated, he noted the accessibility of the
redacted information once it became a part of the trial record and its vulnerability to
"skillful Googlers" who might "put two and two together" and reveal the patients'
identities to the public. 139 Viewed in light of the nightmare scenario of Borough of
Barrington, this demonstrates not only the short distance between government
collection and disclosure of information, but also a prominent judicial recognition of the
same.
A third response to the claim that section 215 does not violate the constitutional
right to information privacy because it authorizes mere government collection of
information, rather than disclosure, is that, in a way, government collection of certain
information in an age of terrorism actually amounts to disclosure of that information.
The USA PATRIOT Act has dramatically reduced the barriers to intelligence sharing
among various law enforcement agencies, and further efforts to facilitate cooperation
between law enforcement and federal agencies are currently debated vigorously in
policy circles. 14  Given that most individuals oppose section 215 not for fear that
federal agents would disclose their reading habits to the public at large, but because the
information might be used to identify them as suspect or dangerous for other law
enforcement purposes, a section 215 order demanding borrowing records is arguably
tantamount to disclosure to other government agencies for the purposes of constitutional
analysis. For example, imagine a library patron who is under FBI suspicion for reading
about the teachings underpinning the Iranian revolution of 1979. If the FBI were to
obtain an order demanding his library borrowing records, he would fear widespread use
of that information among law enforcement officials-made possible by the intra-
governmental dissemination that other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act facilitate.
Thus, from a positive perspective, the collection-versus-dissemination debate does
not necessarily weigh against a challenge to section 215 as a violation of the Whalen
right to information privacy, although it is a difficult obstacle to surmount. Further,
137. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Defending '03 Law, Justice Department Seeks Abortion Records, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at
Al.
138. See Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).
139. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
140. E.g., USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b) (authorizing the sharing of foreign intelligence information
between federal law enforcement, immigration, national defense, or national security officers under certain
circumstances). See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS, 19-23 (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2004) (discussing the intelligence sharing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act). The September 11
commission and President Bush's effort to enlist support for renewing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act
that are set to expire in 2005 have kept the debate over intelligence sharing alive. See Neil A. Lewis, Rule
Created Legal "Wall" to Sharing Information, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at 19 (discussing an interpretation
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act that had prevented the
sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence officers before September 11, 2001);
Richard W. Stevenson & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Pushes for Renewal ofAntiterrorism Legislation, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2004, at 16.
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from a normative standpoint, courts should not draw a sharp distinction between
collection and dissemination-indeed, they should use a section 215 challenge as an
opportunity to announce the insignificance of that distinction. As Part III demonstrates,
this brings the analysis to the balancing of the privacy interest with the government's
need for invading privacy-an analysis that section 215 plaintiffs are likely to win.
IV. BALANCING
Once the threshold determination has been made that reading records are private for
Whalen purposes, and assuming that the distinction between collection and
dissemination of information is not dispositive in the constitutional analysis, challengers
to section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act are in the clear. After finding a legitimate
privacy interest, courts balance it against the government purpose served by the
invasion: "The right to informational privacy.., is not absolute; rather, it is a conditional
right which may be infringed upon a showing of proper governmental interest."
14 1
Because of the extremely weak governmental interest in the reading records of
individuals, plaintiffs would most likely prevail in this inquiry.
Courts have not settled on the appropriate level of scrutiny for analyzing a
governmental infringement of a legitimate privacy interest under the Whalen right to
information privacy. The Supreme Court in Nixon appeared to apply heightened or
intermediate scrutiny, stating that any intrusion on the complainant's privacy "must be
weighed against the public interest" in the challenged measure. 142  Most courts and
circuits have followed this approach, labeling it intermediate scrutiny or a balancing
standard. 143  Some articulate a multi-factored inquiry; the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals employs the most commonly used test. 144  Several courts have used a more
rigorous analysis, applying strict scrutiny to measures that infringe on privacy by
requiring that they serve a compelling government interest and be no more restrictive
than necessary to achieve that end. 145  Each framework provides at least some
141. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
142. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
143. See, e.g., Statharos v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 198 F.3d 317, 324 (2d Cir. 1999)
("We conclude that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate."); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959 ("[T]he
government has the burden of showing that its use of the information would advance a legitimate state interest
and that its actions are narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate interest.") (citations and quotation marks
omitted); Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134 ("Although in the autonomy strand of the right to privacy, something
approaching equal protection 'strict scrutiny' analysis has appeared, we believe that the balancing test, more
common to due process claims, is appropriate here. The constitutionality of the amendment will be
determined by comparing the interests it serves with those it hinders."); State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1149
(Conn. 2002) ("Courts generally have applied a balancing test to determine whether the disclosure of personal
or confidential information is constitutionally permissible under the particular facts and circumstances
presented.").
144. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578. The factors are:
[I ] the type of record requested, [2] the information it does or might contain, [3] the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, [4] the inquiry from disclosure to the
relationship in which the record was generated, [5] the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, [6] the degree of need for access, and [7] whether there is an express
statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward
access.
Id.
145. See, e.g., Falvo, 233 F.3d at 1208 ("In assessing whether a specific category of information is
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additional scrutiny beyond rational basis review, which is more than enough for section
215 challengers to exploit.
The government interest served by section 215-namely, fighting terrorism-is
unquestionably compelling. In an age of terrorist attacks, security alerts, and the
unending tension of the unexpected, no American would deny security services the
effective and reasonable tools to protect the homeland. Yet, as the Colorado Supreme
Court noted in Tattered Cover, Inc., "the law enforcement officials' need to investigate
crime will almost invariably be a compelling one." 146 The salient question, therefore, is
"whether law enforcement officials have a compelling needfor the precise and specific
information sought."14 7 Other courts invariably acknowledge this important distinction
in the privacy context, usually by insisting that the challenged measure be narrowly
tailored to serve a "legitimate" or "appropriate" state interest. 148 Thus, the significant
inquiry in evaluating the importance of the governmental interest advanced by section
215 is examining the usefulness of obtaining suspects' reading records in fighting
terrorism, not merely the importance of the fight itself.
The policy goal underlining section 215, in the words of one of the provision's
supporters, is "aggressive, preemptive law enforcement" in an age of global terror.
149
In light of recent attacks and current threats against the United States, section 215-and
the USA PATRIOT Act more broadly-allows law enforcement officers the flexibility
and access to information they need to discover and intercept terrorist threats before
they happen. 15 Specifically, in reference to reading records, section 215 could give
law enforcement officers who had identified a suspect the opportunity to obtain further
information about him that could shed light on terrorist activities, or it could give
officers the ability to monitor those accessing certain, highly suspicious materials.
These justifications for investigating individuals' reading records in terrorism
investigations are misguided. As a tool in fighting terrorism, section 215 orders are
breathtakingly overinclusive. For instance, a recent FBI bulletin warned law
enforcement officials that almanacs may represent a particularly useful tool for terrorist
operatives to use in selecting targets. 15 1 Were this bulletin to be translated to a secret
section 215 order for bookstores' and libraries' almanac selling and borrowing
•• 152
records-and because of section 215's gag provision, no one knows whether it has
constitutionally protected, this court must consider, (1) if the party asserting the right has a legitimate
expectation of privacy [in that information], (2) if disclosure serves a compelling state interest, and (3) if
disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner."); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995)
(discussing balancing test). The influential Third Circuit ordinarily applies intermediate review, but uses a
"compelling interest analysis" if the privacy intrusion is particularly severe. See Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d
1133, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying intermediate review); see also Paul P. v. Vemiero, 170 F.3d 396, 402
(3d Cir. 1999) (requiring a compelling interest).
146. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1058.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959; Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 385 ("While prevention
of this deadly disease is clearly an appropriate state objective, this objective was not served by Smith's
statement that the DiAngelos should wash with disinfectant.").
149. See Lowry, supra note 16.
150. See Martin, supra note 20, at 285-86.
151. See Dan Eggen, Almanacs May Be Tools for Terrorists, FBI Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at
A2.
152. See USA PATRIOT Act § 215(d) (preventing any person, including the subject of a section 215
order, from disclosing the fact of an order to others). The president of the Boston Public Library, Bernard
[Vol. 3 1:1
Reading For Terrorism
been-the records would implicate hundreds or thousands of individuals, the
overwhelming majority of whom accessed the material for benign purposes. 153 Law
enforcement agents might then cross-check their search results against other
incriminating activity, such as arrest records, to find individuals worthy of further
pursuit. The process just described might at very best yield a lead or two out of many
names canvassed, and as a by-product would stigmatize and chill the legitimate use of
almanacs by a great number of readers.
Section 215 is also an overinclusive terror-fighting tool on the individual level.
Rather than identifying a suspicious book and then investigating those who have bought
or purchased it, the FBI could pursue the reading habits of an already identified terror
suspect. Yet a search of the reading habits of such an individual-who is necessarily
tied inconclusively to terrorism, given the resort to a search of his reading records-will
again cover much, much more innocent than incriminating material. Many suspects are
ultimately found innocent, in which case their reading habits are irrelevant, and even
among the category of legitimate suspects, and the sub-category of those legitimate
suspects who actually make perfidious use of reading materials, most will only do so
with a fraction of their books. Further, any controversial or provocative materials that
the suspect reads will subject him to further suspicion, even if those materials were not
used in any connection with terrorist activity.
Section 215 is also underinclusive. An initial difficulty with investigating reading
habits as a means of intercepting terrorist activity in this regard is that it is necessarily
reactive and ex post; it must rely to a significant degree on reading materials previously
identified as suspicious. For instance, the FBI issued its advisory bulletin on almanacs
because an almanac had in fact been found in an apartment used by an al Qaeda sleeper
agent. 154  Thus, the method presumably under-detects a wide array of previously
undiscovered, so-called dangerous reading materials. Further, flagging certain suspect
materials is, in effect, an attempt to fight terrorism by anticipating the sources of
dangerous or subversive information. Yet surely this is quite an impossible task. If
books as innocuous as almanacs are suspect, the list of other questionable material must
be tremendous: scientific treatises for technical expertise, political manifestos for
radical ideology, sociology texts for understanding the enemy, business journals for
Margolis, has publicly stated that if his library were presented with a section 215 order, he "would give very
serious consideration to informing my trustees about that request and . . . going public with it." David
Mehegan, Reading Over Your Shoulder: The Push is On to Shelve Part of the Patriot Act, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 9, 2004, at E5.
153. Indeed, it is staggering to consider the miniscule number of individuals who have bought or
borrowed almanacs for purposes related to terrorism. See Eggen, supra note 151 (quoting the editor of the
Farmers' Almanac, which collects weather predictions and cleaning tips, among other things: "Our almanac
is about as far away as you can get from terrorism and about as close as you can get to what you would think
of as Americana") (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See id. The al Qaeda agent was Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, in whose apartment investigators
discovered an almanac with bookmarked pages on important American dams, rivers, reservoirs, and railroads.
See id.
155. For a discussion of a similar issue, preventing terrorism by intercepting the voluntary receipt of
certain types of information through limitations on its availability, see Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 176
F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn, reh 'g en banc granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court struck down as a violation of the First Amendment regulations that prevented the distribution of
certain highly sophisticated encryption software, the dissemination of which the government feared would
threaten national security. See id. at 1135.
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organizational efficiency, law books for guidance on legal consequences, newspapers
for staying abreast of political and military developments, and historical tomes for
insight on past terrorist failures and successes, to name a very few.
The over- and under-inclusivity of section 215 thus makes it an exceptionally
imprecise tool for fighting terrorism--one that occupies law enforcement energies and
resources that could be better spent elsewhere. The Supreme Court, in a widely cited
passage, implied the uselessness of this method of investigation in the famous Fourth
Amendment case Stanford v. Texas. 156 The Court struck down as overbroad a search
warrant pursuant to the Texas Suppression Act that authorized a search of the
defendant's apartment for books, pamphlets, or other evidence of Communist
activity. 157 With a restrained sense of irony, the Court noted several of the items seized,
including "works by such diverse writers as Karl Marx, Jean Paul Sartre, Theodore
Draper, Fidel Castro, Earl Browder, Pope John XXIII, and Mr. Justice Hugo L.
Black.' 58 In authorizing a general search of the intellectual pursuits of the defendant,
the Court concluded, the state of Texas had committed an act directly analogous to the
British policies that America's founders sought to escape. 159
Another significant infirmity with using reading records to identify suspicious or
subversive behavior is the tendency to abuse this investigative method. History is
replete with such instances. For example, the FBI's "Library Awareness Program" of
the Cold War era was designed to prevent Soviet diplomats and intelligence personnel
from culling unclassified but critical information from America's scientific and
technical libraries. 16  Nevertheless, librarians in general-use facilities including the
New York City Public Library reported interactions with FBI agents, in which the
agents appeared interested mainly in learning about the library activities of foreign
patrons who looked suspicious. 16 1 Similarly, in 1970 the Internal Revenue Service sent
agents to public libraries requesting the names of individuals who had borrowed certain
books discussing explosive devices. 162  After scrutiny by the American Library
Association and Senator Sam Ervin, the Secretary of the Treasury publicly stated that he
had not authorized such activities, which soon ceased. 163 These cursory examples of
abuse in a history of government investigation of reading habits should inform a court's
decision to reject section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act as a narrowly tailored means
to a legitimate government purpose.
Finally, proponents of section 215 have defended the measure as a largely harmless
terrorism-fighting tool on the grounds that it has never actually been used, and would be
reserved for the most pressing of circumstances. 164  As an initial matter, Attorney
General Ashcroft's prominent announcement that no section 215 orders have issued to
156. 379 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1965).
157. See id. at 478-80.
158. Id. at 479-80 (emphasis omitted).
159. See id. at 480-83.
160. See Ault, supra note 20, at 1533-34; see generally HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE
STACKS: THE FBI's LIBRARY AWARENESS PROGRAM (1991).
161. See Ault, supra note 20, at 1536.
162. See O'Neil, supra note 20, at 214.
163. See id.
164. See Bottum, supra note 16; Lowry, supra note 16; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Let's Focus on Real Threats to
Liberty, Not False Alarms 35 NAT'L J. 3399, 3399-3400 (2003).
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date has been disputed by librarians across the country and is unverifiable because of
the provision's gag order and the classified nature of the information. 165 Nevertheless,
the argument that a law concededly inimical to constitutional freedoms that is used in
secret and produces classified results is un-problematic merely because the government
claims it has not yet been used seems naive to the point of being absurd. It also belies
an American ethos of healthy skepticism of governmental interference in citizens'
liberty-one that Mr. Ashcroft's Justice Department has provided ample grounds for
maintaining. 166
In sum, "[t]here is no evidence that government searches of library [or bookstore]
records have any value," and considerable evidence showing that such searches are
ineffective and prone to abuse. 167 Against this weak governmental interest, courts must
balance the considerable privacy interests of individuals in their reading records.
168
When faced with an overbroad and unworkable tool in the war on terror that infringes
significant First Amendment freedoms through the loss of reader privacy, courts should
strike that tool down under either heightened or strict scrutiny. Such a policy clearly
does not outweigh the harms that it creates, and is not narrowly tailored to a legitimate
government interest, to quote the tests of two courts that apply intermediate scrutiny in
Whalen privacy cases.169
V. CONCLUSION
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which amends the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to allow FBI searches of, among other things, reading records, is
constitutionally infirm. While the natural inclination of scholars and advocates is to
demonstrate this assertion with reference to the First and Fourth Amendments, an
additional, and potentially useful, mode of attack exists. The constitutional right to
information privacy, which has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court and most
federal circuit courts of appeals, provides a plausible basis for litigants to challenge this
harmful provision. Fitting section 215 into the doctrinal framework of the
constitutional right to information privacy is not without its difficulties, but should
advocates succeed in doing so, they will likely prevail in demonstrating that the harms
the section creates outweigh the governmental interests it serves. This constitutional
malady also counsels toward serious consideration of legislative attempts to amend
section 215.
Significantly, a court's determination that section 215 violates the right to
information privacy does not necessarily mean that the government can never advance a
165. See Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 15. In addition, a recent Boston Globe article reported the
following:
In a survey last fall of 465 public and 120 private libraries in Illinois by the Library Research
Center, seven public libraries reported that they had received requests for information about
patrons or circulation records from the FBI, and 17 said other requests came from police or other
agencies. Eight said the reason given for the requests was a national security investigation.
Mehegan, supra note 152.
166. See generally A Question of Freedom, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2003, at 29.
167. See Martin, supra note 20, at 292.
168. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
169. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134.
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pressing enough interest in a suspect's reading records to warrant investigating them. If
a challenge succeeded in overturning section 215 as applied, rather than on its face, then
the government would merely have to show a legitimate or compelling (as the case may
be) interest in the particular search in question in order to overcome the significant
harms created by investigating reading habits. Those harms, however, are severe
indeed, so a court should, when presented with the opportunity, strike down section 215
as a violation of the constitutional right to information privacy.
